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Augustine’s Contribution to the 
Republican Tradition
Paul J. Cornish Grand Valley State University
abstract:  The present argument focuses on part of Augustine’s defense of 
Christianity in The City of God. There Augustine argues that the Christian religion did 
not cause the sack of Rome by the Goths in 410 ce. Augustine revised the definitions 
of a ‘people’ and ‘republic’ found in Cicero’s De Republica in light of the impossibility 
of true justice in a world corrupted by sin. If one returns these definitions to their 
original context, and accounts for Cicero’s own political teachings, one finds that 
Augustine follows Cicero’s republicanism on several key points. First, civil rule differs 
from mastery over slaves. Second, political life is indeterminate, so a republic could 
be any regime suitable for governing free human beings. Third, the prudent man may 
not abstain from public service. For Augustine the duty to public service is connected 
to his tragic portrayal of life and suffering in society after ‘the fall’. Augustine’s 
contribution to the republican tradition is not to be found in the concept of a natural 
order, but in an explanation of why that order fails.
key words:  Augustine, Cicero, justice, nature, republic, sin, skepticism
Operating on the assumption that Christianity is more compatible with monarchy 
than republicanism, historians and political theorists often move from Aristotle 
or Cicero to a discussion of Machiavelli in their narratives of the development 
of republicanism.1 The tendency to contrast monarchy with republicanism is 
 misleading because in the classical context the two concepts were understood 
not to be mutually exclusive. In Cicero’s De Republica the term re publica is used 
as a general term that refers to three pure ‘forms’ of governments (monarchy, 
aristocracy and democracy) as well as to the mixed regime of the classical Roman 
republic.2 Thus a republic could be a monarchy, an aristocracy, a democracy or 
some combination of the three. The mixed constitution of republican Rome is 
central to Cicero’s dialogue, while the only republic St Augustine would have 
known was the later Roman Empire.3
In a recent work Antony Black has argued that the Christian ethos is as consist-
ent with republicanism as it is with monarchy.4 Black disposed of the opposition 
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between Christianity and republicanism in European political thought in his brief 
but carefully constructed argument. Strangely the ancient writer who defended 
Christianity most famously against the charge that it undermined the Roman 
republic, St Augustine of Hippo, is passed over without mention, as are his famous 
revisions of Cicero’s definitions of ‘people’ and ‘republic’.5 Black instead posits a 
standard contemporary definition of ‘republic’ and shows how various Christian 
writings and practices accord with it. Another weakness in Black’s approach is his 
implicit acceptance of the theoretical opposition between republican government 
and hereditary monarchy.
Cary Nederman suggests a corrective to Black’s approach, demonstrating that 
there is a history of Christian republicanism that assumes a natural hierarchy 
and is not hostile to monarchy or any other form of constitution.6 However 
Nederman begins his account of Christian republicanism with a passage from 
Gregory the Great. So despite their points of disagreement, one might say that 
both authors argue that republicanism develops within Christianity in Europe 
during the Middle Ages, and that both fail to mention Augustine in their accounts 
of Christian republicanism.
The decision to avoid Augustine’s works in a short essay on republican thought 
is understandable. Augustine was a bishop and theologian and none of his works 
is exclusively devoted to civil government. One standard interpretation of his 
political teaching holds that Augustine believed that the only function of political 
rule is to remedy sin, and that human beings are not naturally political animals.7 
In Augustine’s late antique world there could be no question of politics leading 
human beings to happiness, since happiness was not to be found in this life.8
This interpretation of Augustine’s view of the status of politics has been chal-
lenged in a number of recent studies. Peter Burnell has argued that Augustine 
did consider political rule to be rooted in nature.8 John von Heyking also has 
defended the idea that Augustine’s works entail a ‘right-by-nature’ understand-
ing of politics.10 Paul Weithman has shown that Augustine considered politics to 
have a natural directive function distinct from that of domestic society.11 Besides 
these works by political theorists, some philosophers and theologians working on 
Augustine have come to reject what has come to be referred to as the ‘realist’ inter-
pretation of Augustine’s attitude towards politics,12 which holds that Augustine 
presents a portrait of human nature that is so irredeemably corrupted by sin that 
the earthly city always requires power and subordination.13 These studies come at 
a time when political events seem to have contributed to a more general interest 
in Augustine than in recent decades.14
Here I construe Augustine’s attitude toward the Roman republic and civil gov-
ernment in general through statements in various books of The City of God. I 
consider the extent to which Augustine’s teaching on political life incorporates 
some views espoused by Cicero in his many works, but especially in De Republica. I 
follow scholars who argue that Cicero’s works suggest that he viewed political life 
as permanently problematic. Cicero’s political prudence recognized that there are 
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less than reasonable tendencies in political life, and led him to shift his focus from 
the issue of the best regime to that of the model statesman.15 Augustine’s view of 
the indeterminacy of political life in book 19 of The City of God radicalizes Cicero’s 
concern about the problematic nature of politics while maintaining Cicero’s dis-
tinction between civil government and slavery, statesmanship and domination. 
Though Augustine shows little concern about the nature of a model statesman, he 
makes it clear that he believed that the prudent man was driven by natural neces-
sity to engage in public service, even though it would cause him to suffer.
Augustine’s adaptation of Cicero’s definitions of a ‘people’ and ‘republic’ help 
clarify Augustine’s transformation of Cicero’s teachings. To show this I attend 
to Cicero’s revaluation of rhetoric as an integral part of the active life of the 
statesman and his explicit endorsement of the moderate skepticism of the New 
Academy of Carneades.16 Cicero’s definitions treat the term ‘republic’ as a general 
concept that can apply to any constitution. This activity of defining becomes cen-
tral to Augustine’s argument against the infamous position that there are natural 
slaves. In the end Augustine follows Cicero in opposing republican government 
to conquest and mastery over slaves, and not opposing republican government to 
monarchy. This can be seen in the metaphor of an order of rule and subjection 
within human nature that corresponds to the order of human society and that is 
employed by both authors.
We know the intentions of Augustine’s arguments from his own brief com-
ments on the City of God in his work Retractations.17 Augustine intended to comfort 
Christians who had suffered through the sack of Rome and to persuade the pagans 
who argued that Christianity caused the sack. The present discussion ranges from 
the first five books of the City of God, which are a response to the pagan view that 
the fall of Rome was due to the failure to worship the Roman gods, to the final 
section on the respective ends of the earthly and heavenly cities. This is appropri-
ate to an interpretation of Augustine’s discussion of Cicero’s definitions, which 
arise in book 2, where Augustine promises to return to them at a later point. That 
return is found in book 19.
1
One obstacle to a clear understanding of Augustine’s revision of Cicero’s defini-
tions of a ‘people’ and a ‘republic’ is the complexity of Cicero’s own position in 
De Republica.18 That complexity is magnified by the fact that the dialogue comes 
down to us in fragments. Cicero’s preface to book 1 set out an argument against 
the Epicurean notion that the wise man pursues a private life of ease. He argues 
that nature gives human beings a need for virtue and the protection of the com-
mon safety that overcomes their desire for the enjoyment of pleasure.19 Walter 
Nicgorski and J. Jackson Barlow both offer evidence that this work entails a shift 
in ancient political science away from a focus on the ‘best regime’ toward a focus 
on the ‘ideal statesman’.20 The implications of such a shift have to be made clear 
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before proceeding, and one implication has to do with a modification of the 
Aristotelian approach to slavery.
Cicero’s main interlocutor, Scipio, gives his famous definitions in book 1 of the 
dialogue. Scipio says that a republic (res publica) is the people’s property (re populi). 
He then defines a ‘people’ (populus):
But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, 
but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to 
justice and a partnership for the common good.21
The definitions are based on the idea that justice has a basis in nature, and that 
no republic can be governed without justice. Scipio attributes this idea to Plato 
and Aristotle.
In his subsequent discussion of the best regime, Scipio argues that Rome’s 
republic is the best regime. Using Aristotle’s typology of regimes based on the 
rule of one, the few, and the many, he is pressed into naming monarchy as the 
best regime in theory. However, Scipio concludes that a moderate mixture of 
monarchy, aristocracy, and popular rule would be best in practice. This is his 
understanding of the Roman constitution.22 He then recounts innovations in 
Roman politics over a number of centuries in order to show that a constitution 
modified by many statesmen over generations is superior to the constitution of 
a single lawgiver. Scipio is praised by Laelius for having invented a new style of 
political dialogue. Unlike the Greek philosophers, Scipio argues that the best 
regime is one founded over a long period of time by many wise statesmen.23
Rome’s laws and the men who governed Rome were not always just and virtu-
ous, since innovations in the laws were needed to avert tyranny and quell disorders. 
Another interlocutor, Lucius Furius Philus, makes this point. He urges Scipio to 
reconsider the question since another common view is that no state (civitas) can 
be ruled without injustice.24 Philus is chosen to present an argument in favor of 
the view that bases the state on injustice. He agrees with the understanding that 
the arguments he will present are not his but those of Carneades, a skeptic and 
the leader of the New Academy, who once visited Rome on an embassy from 
Athens (155 bce). Carneades made two public speeches on consecutive days, first 
defending the idea of natural justice and then refuting it. According to Plutarch, 
Carneades became very popular with the young men of Rome. Cato was offended 
by Carneades’ attack on conventional Roman virtue and had him and the other 
philosophers expelled from the city.25
The order of the speeches is reversed in Cicero’s work. First Philus makes the 
case against natural justice, and against the idea that the state cannot be ruled 
without justice. Justice is not natural because peoples have different and con-
flicting laws, and because states change their laws over time. Further, justice is 
foolish and conflicts with prudence. Prudence teaches one to pursue his or her 
own interest, whereas justice teaches one to pursue the interests of others. Utility 
teaches statesmen to expand their state and its resources regardless of justice.26 
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These arguments are supported with observations about Roman practices (Rome 
built shrines for the men who expanded the state by conquest). Justice is at best 
conventional and seems contrary to the interests of the republic.27 Philus asserts 
that all who exercise the power over life and death are tyrants, though they prefer 
to be called kings.28
Laelius responds to these points in the famous ‘vera lex’ passage.29 There is a 
true law that embodies natural justice that is the same everywhere and is compre-
hensible through right reason. The fragments of Laelius’ speech are convoluted 
but he appears to develop the passage on natural justice into a ‘just war’ defense of 
Roman conquests. Then there is a paraphrase of Aristotle’s views on slavery.30
Do we not observe that dominion has been granted by nature to everything that is best, to 
the great advantage of the weak? For why else does god rule over the man, the mind over 
the body, and reason over the lust and anger and the other evil (vitiosis) elements of the 
mind . . . But we must distinguish different kinds of subjection. For the mind rules over 
the body, and also over the lust; but it rules over the body as a king governs his subjects, 
or a father his children, whereas it rules over the lust as a master rules his slave, restraining 
it and breaking its power. So kings, commanders, magistrates, senators, and popular 
assemblies govern citizens as the mind governs the body; but the master’s restraint of his 
slaves is like the restraint exercised by the best part of the mind (animus), the reason, over 
its own evil and weak elements, such as lustful desires, anger, and the other disquieting 
emotions.31
There are two key points to be drawn from this passage. One is that Laelius 
describes two types of natural rule and subjection. One type is characterized by 
reasoned command and obedience, while the other is characterized by coercion. 
Notice that rule in a republic and paternal rule are placed into one category and 
that slavery is placed into the other. Also notice that Laelius follows Scipio’s 
 earlier discussion by listing the ruling offices for each of the three pure forms of 
constitutions in his analysis of the order of nature. In this sense the concept of a 
divinely ordained natural order and hierarchy that Cary Nederman ascribes to the 
Christian republicanism of the medieval period is present in classical thought.
The second point is that Laelius’ account of the order of nature is different 
from Aristotle’s. Aristotle had characterized the rule of the mind over the body 
as that of a master over a slave, and the rule of the intellect over the appetites as 
political and monarchical. Scholars have taken two distinct approaches to this 
issue. The first approach is to deny that this matters and assert that Laelius is 
simply giving another version of the defense of slavery as natural.32 The other 
approach understands Cicero to be substituting a justification for slavery based 
on character defect for Aristotle’s justification based on nature.33 This second 
approach seems more probable given the discussion of Rome’s history by Scipio 
following Laelius’ speech.
Scipio returns to the discussion and draws the speakers’ attention back to his 
definitions and the issue of natural justice. He reminds Laelius that all existing 
republics, including Rome, had engaged in unjust wars or at times had fallen under 
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control of unjust factions. Scipio adopts the view that the true republic exists only 
in theory. In practice the term may be used to refer to imperfect regimes.34 A 
republic then is the people’s estate, but no people remains permanently united in 
the pursuit of justice. No state can exist without justice, but the conduct of public 
affairs leads to injustice.35
Cicero’s discourse should be seen to have important consequences for the way 
we understand Roman attitudes toward slavery. To begin with, Aristotle’s idea 
of a type of slavery that does not arise from coercion is excluded. Slavery is by 
definition coercion, and has its origins in conquest. But if slavery has its origins 
in conquest, and if only some conquests are just, then many slaves suffer a penalty 
that they do not deserve. The practical implications of this perspective for rela-
tions between masters and slaves are spelled out in some detail by Cicero in the De 
Officiis.36 There in his account of justice Cicero discusses duties arising from the 
virtue of justice connected to war. He expressly argues that masters have obliga-
tions of justice to their slaves, a view that directly contradicts Aristotle’s account 
of mastery. This interpretation points to the doctrine of slavery as it developed in 
classical Roman law, where slavery is held to be justified but contrary to nature. 
The point is that slavery, like tyrannical rule, has its origins in coercion while 
republican rule per se arises from natural necessity.
These passages reveal the way in which Cicero’s commitment to the philosophi-
cal skepticism of the New Academy may reinforce the great value that Cicero 
placed on statesmanship and rhetoric.37 Cicero’s use of the skeptical method arises 
from his conviction that Carneades saved Socratic philosophy from the tendency 
of the Stoics dogmatically to assert explanations that seemed disconnected from 
the natural necessities of human life.38 As John von Heyking has noted, Augustine 
adopted key aspects of Cicero’s defense of rhetoric in his treatise On Christian 
Doctrine. Like Cicero, Augustine believed that rhetoric was a noble art that could 
serve to instruct, delight, or move one’s listeners.39
2
Paying close attention to Augustine’s rhetoric, one quickly realizes that this 
skeptical dimension of Cicero is pervasive in those passages of The City of God 
that involve Augustine’s assessment of the status of political rule and the Roman 
republic. Augustine recounts a famous anecdote about Alexander the Great and a 
pirate in book 4 of the City of God. It is fair to assume that the immediate source of 
the anecdote was the speech given by the character Philus in Cicero’s De Republica, 
and that the story may have originated with Carneades himself.40 Alexander’s 
soldiers captured a pirate. Alexander asked the pirate what he meant by keeping 
hostile possession of the seas. The pirate replied:
What do you mean by seizing the whole earth, but because I do it in a small ship, I am 
called a robber, while you who do it with a great fleet are styled ‘emperor’.41
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Does Augustine consider all political ruling to be tyrannical? Is political rule in 
the same class of human relations as is mastery over slaves, or the rule of pirates 
over their captives?
Book 4 had begun with a summary of Augustine’s arguments concerning the 
history of the Roman constitution in response to the claim that the pagan religion 
of Rome had been the cause of Roman greatness. Pleasing the gods ensured happi-
ness in life and Christianity undermined civic virtue and led to decline. Augustine 
uses the testimony of Roman authors against those who would condemn the 
Christian religion (he uses material from Sallust and Cicero against Varro).42 It 
turns out that the ‘good old days’ of the republic were not really that good. When 
Rome was not embroiled in wars with other peoples, it was embroiled in civil wars 
at home. The republic often punished some of its most virtuous citizens.43 Sallust 
had shown that the Romans were ‘virtuous and moderate’ only when they were 
compelled by a fear of Carthage.44 ‘But after the destruction of Carthage there 
came the highest pitch of discord, greed, ambition, and all the evils which gener-
ally spring up in times of prosperity.’45
Augustine’s rhetoric may be seen as a reformulation Cicero’s discussion of the 
problematic nature of Roman conquests and of politics in general from book 3 of 
De Republica. To use von Heyking’s language, the Roman ordinate love of glory 
was only constrained from becoming the degrading lust to dominate by the fear 
of Carthage.
In the same passage Augustine asks, ‘Justice being taken away, what are 
kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves, but little king-
doms?’ In doing so he draws us back into the classical debate over the relationship 
between justice and political rule. Notice that this question reorients Augustine’s 
rhetoric. Here he assumes the view that no republic deserving of the name is 
entirely without justice, and this is an orientation that he never abandons. As 
Burrell argues, Augustine’s decision to omit justice from his definition of a people 
and a republic in no way precludes him from understanding justice to be neces-
sary to the existence of a republic.46 On the other hand, Augustine asks whether 
Roman wars of conquest were morally distinct from the actions of pirates and 
brigands. Augustine’s rhetoric raises doubts about the meaning of ‘republic’, but 
also maintains a distinction between the love of glory during Rome’s republican 
history and the lust to dominate other peoples that arose later. One disposition is 
consistent with civil ruling, the other with tyranny.
So, was the Roman republic a great robber band? Did Augustine associate Rome 
with his understanding of the corrupt ‘earthly city’?47 When speaking specifically 
of the wars that led to Rome’s expansion he is willing to accept that some of these 
were justified.48 This merely shows that Rome benefited from the wickedness of 
others, and that Rome’s love of glory was the source of its own corruption:
Let them ask, then, whether it is fitting for good men to rejoice in extended empire. For 
the iniquity of those with whom just wars are carried on favors the growth of a kingdom, 
which would certainly have been small if the peace and justice of neighbors had not by any 
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wrong provoked the carrying on of war against them; and human affairs being thus happy, 
all kingdoms would have been small, rejoicing in neighborly concord . . .49
If not for the wickedness of its neighbours, Rome would not have been able to 
preserve its austere virtue as exemplified by four great Romans whom Augustine 
upholds as model citizens: Regulus, Scaevola, Scipio and Fabricius.50
3
It should be clear that it is necessary to understand Augustine’s discussion of the 
anecdote of Alexander and the pirate in the context of his analysis of Cicero’s 
definitions. Augustine takes up Cicero’s definitions to demonstrate that Cicero 
and other great Romans had identified the corruption and decline of the Roman 
republic in times long before the birth of Jesus.51 Augustine promises to revisit the 
issue of defining a republic later, and to show that even at the pinnacle of Roman 
virtue, Rome did not conform to the definition. Without Christ there can be no 
true justice, without justice there can be no ‘people’, and no ‘republic’. Augustine 
takes up the problem where Scipio leaves it, and proceeds to give a Christian 
explanation of the factors that prevent any temporal republic from conforming 
to true justice. The groundwork for his explanation is found in his discussion 
of creation, original sin and the order of nature,52 and in his defense of natural 
liberty.53
In his discussion of the origins of the two cities Augustine gives his famous treat-
ment of the philosophical problem of evil, and in doing so addresses the theme 
of the order of rule and subjection in human nature. There he argues that human 
goodness, and especially the good will of the first man, was dependent upon God’s 
grace. When the human will defected from God it ceased to be good. At that point 
the order of human nature was lost, and the subject elements of human nature 
ceased to obey the ruling elements. The earthly city has its origin in sin.
On this account human beings are born into strife, since our flesh lusts against 
our spirit.54 Later Augustine takes up the issue of the relationships among the 
parts of the soul, particularly the reasoning part and the appetitive parts. There 
he grants the philosophical views stated by Laelius that in this life the ‘law of 
 wisdom’ must restrain the anger and the lusts, but denies that this is due to human 
nature. This disobedience is just punishment for the first man’s disobedience. 
Before sin human appetites would have been ordered and would not have caused 
suffering.55
The notion of the order of nature created by God reappears in book 19 as 
Augustine begins his discussion of the ends of the two cities. That book opens 
with a discussion of Marcus Varro’s account of the various views of happiness held 
by the philosophical schools, and Varro’s defense of the view of the Old Academy 
founded by Plato. On this view the summum bonum is a combination of the virtues 
of the soul and primary natural goods of the body, both of which were understood 
to be desired as good in themselves.56 Augustine then turns back to the biblical 
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account of human origins, and points out that Christians reject the philosophical 
identification of the summum bonum with any kind of temporal good. He eventu-
ally works his discourse back to the philosophical school endorsed by Cicero, the 
New Academy.
Augustine gives an account of the cardinal virtues in light of his doctrine of the 
Fall. The order in which he takes up the virtues follows from his understanding 
of fallen human nature. Virtue is not natural, but rather something brought in 
by instruction to fight the perpetual war with vice. Temperance is necessary to 
free the mind from the lust of the flesh that would lead to crimes of every sort. 
Prudence is the vigilant discrimination between good and evil. The function of 
Justice is to assign to each his due. Human beings were made according to the 
image and likeness of God and were placed in what Augustine calls the ‘right 
order of nature’ (justus ordo naturae). The body was subject to the soul, and the 
soul was subject to God, and so the body and the soul were obedient to God. 
When human beings chose to ignore God’s command and act according to their 
own wills, this order and the integrity of human nature were lost. The result is the 
privation of the right order of nature, original sin. This makes justice obscure to 
human reason and an impossible standard for temporal society. Fortitude involves 
suffering this disorder with patience.57
According to Augustine the Christian understands and accepts the tragic uncer-
tainty of the present life, and is better able to bear suffering with fortitude than 
pagan priests and philosophers. This suffering is discussed in chapters 5–10 of 
book 19. Augustine argues that all human beings suffer in this life, not because 
they are evil, but simply because of the ignorance and uncertainty to which one is 
subject in human society. Augustine speaks of three circles of human society: the 
household and family, the city, and the world. Even in the smallest circle based 
on natural affection, one is not safe from pain and misunderstanding. One will 
experience the death of loved ones, or even the betrayal of a malevolent child.58
To drive home the political implications of this uncertainty Augustine describes 
the vocation of a judge. In Roman society the judge was required by law to torture 
witnesses in order to obtain evidence. Worse still, the judge had to condemn men 
to death knowing that some were bound to have been innocent. Unlike the Stoic 
philosophers who had argued that the just judge could remain happy by becom-
ing detached from this suffering, the Christian must acknowledge that even the 
virtuous judge cannot be immune to the pain caused by one’s ignorance of the 
complete truth. Worse still, it would be wrong for the judge to withdraw from 
public life, since a duty is owed to society.59 It is not surprising that a study of 
Augustine’s political activity reveals him frequently interceding for clemency on 
behalf of criminals, even those condemned to death.60
In our present condition we frequently mistake friend for enemy, and enemy for 
friend: And if we escape this pitiable blindness, is not unfeigned confidence and mutual 
love of true and good friends, our true solace in human society, filled as it is with 
misunderstandings and calamities?61 If such uncertainty exists among people who are part 
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of the same civil society, and even the same household, what of the uncertainty experienced 
by strangers? For if two men, each ignorant of the other’s language, meet, and are not 
compelled to pass, but, on the contrary, to remain in company, dumb animals, though 
of different species, would more easily hold intercourse than they, human beings though 
they be. For their common nature is no help to friendliness when they are perverted by 
diversity of language from conveying their sentiments to one another, so that a man would 
more readily hold conversation with his own dog than with a foreigner.62
Note Augustine’s insight into the classical claim that human beings are naturally 
political animals. Aristotle argued that the key attribute of human nature that 
makes humans political animals is the ability to speak about the just, the good, 
and the noble.63 Augustine explains that the inability of people to communicate 
about these things is the central cause of war. The point is not to show that human 
beings are not social and political animals, but to show that the corruption of 
original sin has made true society impossible.
War is part of the human condition. Yet the act of war aims at the kind of good 
people can attain in this earthly space, peace. It is the order of temporal peace that 
can and must guide a judge and the statesman. Yet no virtuous judge or ruler can 
preclude the suffering of innocent people.64
One may now summarize Augustine’s view of the Roman Republic. Augustine 
agreed with Cicero that Rome’s love of glory was superior to the lust to domi-
nate in the empire. The early republic, because it had been motivated by the 
fear of Carthage, loved an ‘austere virtue’. Imperial expansion, at first motivated 
by fear of other cities, eventually instilled into Romans the lust for domination. 
Augustine illuminates the political importance of the seemingly apolitical morality 
of the Gospels. Christianity teaches one to love God and to love one’s neighbours 
as oneself. Augustine interpreted this to mean that one must harm no one and 
that one must do what one can to help others. The commandment to love one’s 
neighbour, then, is not entirely distinct from the order of justice, since it is itself 
a command to do justice, but it also imposes duties that transcend those of justice. 
Far from encouraging us to seclude ourselves into an Epicurean circle of friends, 
Augustine places anyone exercising authority in the position of the just judge. It 
may seem rather simple to avoid doing harm, but one surely will suffer if he acts 
on the duty to help others, and the Christian may not put aside that duty.65
All human actions, good or evil, aim at some kind of peace. The highest good 
for human nature is eternal peace, but human beings also seek temporal peace.66 
Augustine gives an extended analysis of universal peace as concentric circles of 
human society, each of which has its own order (i.e. ‘the arrangement of equals 
and unequals which gives each its proper place’):
The peace of the body consists in the duly proportioned arrangement of its parts. The 
peace of the irrational soul is the harmonious repose of its appetites, and the rational soul 
the harmony of knowledge and action. The peace of body and soul is the well-ordered and 
harmonious life of the living creature. Peace between man and God is the well-ordered 
obedience of faith to eternal law. Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord. 
Domestic peace is the well-ordered concord between those in the family who rule and 
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those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens. The peace of the 
celestial city is the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and one another 
in God. The peace of all things is the tranquility of order. Order is the distribution which 
allots all things equal and unequal, each its own place.67
In this description of the order of peace Augustine does not mention directly an 
order of rule and subjection between a master and a slave. That may be because 
one part of the Greek and Roman practice of slavery was to include the slave as a 
member of the complete household, and therefore part of domestic peace. Be that 
as it may, the subsequent chapters of the book clarify the issue. There is a civil rule 
that is not, like slavery, coercive.
Human beings are rational and pursue peace through an ordered agreement 
of knowledge and action. In our sinful state we require divine instruction, which 
teaches us to love God and to love our neighbour.68 These commandments 
require that a person harm no one, and that he help everyone if possible. This 
second requirement is most true in the order of domestic society. Domestic peace 
requires that husbands must rule their wives, parents their children, and masters 
their servants; and that the response to this guidance is due obedience. Yet this 
in itself is not enough, since the just person must rule out of a dutiful concern for 
others.69 The proper motivation of any ruler toward his subjects is determined by 
the subjects’ nature. In the order of nature, man was made in a state of natural 
liberty. Slavery came into being because of sin and was not part of God’s created 
order. Commenting on Genesis 1: 26, Augustine defends the idea that people 
were created in a state of natural liberty:
He did not intend that his rational creature, who was made in His image, should have 
dominion over anything but irrational creation – not man over man, but man over beasts.70
Later Augustine reinforces this point, saying that God first created human nature 
so that no one would be a slave to sin or to man. However, slavery was ordained by 
the natural law that bids us to preserve the natural order by punishing those who 
sin. Slaves taken in the conduct of war actually suffer the penalty of sin. Notice that 
this view coincides with the understanding of slavery in classical Roman law.71
When Augustine returns to Cicero’s definitions, he deconstructs them in the 
light of the Christian understanding of the disordered state of temporal life.72 
Original sin makes true justice impossible. With no justice, then there can be no 
sense of right and a people cannot be united in their common understanding of 
right. Rome never could have been a people or a republic. Laelius’ attempt to 
defend Roman conquests in terms of the right order of nature falls into the error 
of defining natural justice as the advantage of the stronger over the weaker.73 
Justice is properly defined as the virtue that assigns to each his due. It is unjust for 
some people to serve others as masters and an ‘imperial city, embracing a mighty 
state, cannot command provinces without pursuing injustice’. Augustine agrees 
with Laelius that there is an order of nature but rejects its application in a justifi-
cation of Roman conquest.74 He points out that this description is introduced in 
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Cicero’s dialogue ‘as if’ it were drawn from nature. It displays Laelius’ confusion 
of the disorder caused by sin with the natural order.
When human beings serve God, the soul does indeed command the body and 
reason moderates the appetites. However, when a person does not serve God, 
there can be neither a right order of the individual nature nor an order of justice in 
society. Rome, even during the earliest days of the republic, failed to be truly just 
because it did not teach its citizens to love the one true God. Rome’s civil religion, 
far from contributing to Rome’s glory, actually sowed the seeds of Rome’s corrup-
tion. As Cicero admits, no temporal republic could fit Scipio’s definitions.75
Augustine’s treatment does not end with this deconstruction. He posits a defini-
tion of a people that is applicable to temporal republics. A republic is the people’s 
property, and a people is ‘a large gathering of rational beings united in fellowship 
by their agreement about the objects of their love’.76 Peoples may be judged based 
on the objects loved. Augustine would consider the best temporal republic to be 
one in which the government and the laws reflect the people’s love of God and 
neighbour. This is the morality of the heavenly city, but it entails precisely the 
perfect justice that is not possible for any temporal regime.77
Augustine argues that Christianity, because it teaches public morals more 
effectively, is superior to Rome’s pagan religion. Like the regime of the ancient 
Hebrews, which was provided with a simple but comprehensive system of laws 
in the language of the people,78 Christianity encourages genuine virtue among 
the citizens of any republic.79 Given this, it is quite impossible to conclude that 
Augustine considered political rule to be simply a coercive remedy for sin. In 
his discussion of universal peace he clearly sets political or civil rule apart from 
domestic rule, suggesting that civil authority has a natural directive function in 
society distinct from domestic life.80 He even argues that the household should be 
organized to reflect the order of civil peace, since the end of the part is directed 
to the end of the whole.81
4
Contemporary theorists of civic republicanism locate the practical and theoretical 
origin of republicanism in ancient Rome.82 Based on this narrative St Augustine’s 
appraisal of the Roman republic must be seen as an important chapter in the histori-
cal development of the republican tradition. We have argued that St Augustine’s 
political teaching in The City of God may be seen to be consistent with Cicero’s 
republican political thought on three key points. First, Augustine distinguished 
between the rule that was consistent with slavery and political rule or, in other 
words, between domination and liberty. Second, Augustine saw political rule as 
being necessarily problematic and indeterminate. Though Augustine believed 
that Christians could accept the doctrines of the faith with certainty, and that 
dogmatically doubting the evidence of the senses was madness, he acknowledged 
that one may entertain doubts about a range of issues that were not ascertained by 
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the senses, taught by the scriptures, or witnessed by the Apostles.83 Clearly much 
of what we seek to know about and to act upon in the world of civil governance 
fits into these categories.
Finally, though the life of leisure in contemplation of the one true God may be 
the most contented life, it cannot be chosen by a prudent person. Society is neces-
sary for the continuation of life, and the virtuous person accepts his duty to serve 
even as he recognizes the suffering service entails. The prudent ruler rules for the 
common good, and not out of the lust to dominate. As a result the virtuous ruler 
is always placed in the tragic situation of the just judge described by Augustine, 
potentially punishing or even killing the innocent.
This emphasis on the tragic nature of political action is itself a major con-
tribution to the history of republicanism. Nederman is quite right to stress the 
importance of the idea of a natural order of rule and subjection in medieval repub-
licanism, but a close study of Augustine’s City of God reveals the way in which this 
organic metaphor is adapted from classical sources and transformed in Augustine’s 
Christian account.84 When we look for Augustine’s contribution we find it not in 
the concept of a natural order, but in an explanation of why that order fails.
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